Analyzing Tensions Between American and Chinese Debaters

Jaycee - Guest Blogger | 6 minute read

In recent years, debate rounds between American and Chinese debaters have become increasingly frequent. Debaters of Chinese nationality have become more present at major American debate tournaments, such as NSDA Nationals, university invitationals, and the Tournament of Champions. Because debate is such an enriching experience, many of my friends and I have pulled all-nighters to compete online or travelled to the US for in-person events.

However, problems arise when the debate topic touches on Chinese politics. Drawing on conversations with both Chinese and US debaters about these experiences, I hope this article will unpack the complexity of the issue and propose two cost-effective solutions that benefit debaters from both countries

Why might Chinese debaters feel uncomfortable debating Chinese politics?

I. Safety

Debating Chinese politics at American tournaments usually does not pose a safety threat for Chinese nationals, but Chinese debaters may nonetheless perceive that the risk exists. In China, people usually avoid openly discussing sensitive political issues or expressing personal political opinions in public. Self-censorship is common. People practice it to avoid post deletions or account bans, in more serious cases being invited to “drink tea” with officials, and, in the most extreme cases, detention. In terms of the debate community, the authorities have not severely punished debaters for engaging with political topics overseas. However, they did shut down the 2021 NSDA China, most likely due to a line in its evidence packet disputing Xinjiang’s status as Chinese territory. Overall, the risks are real, although the amount of impact it has on Chinese nationals may vary from person to person.

II. Accessibility.

Limited access to information is a more structural and widespread issue. Although VPNs are available, the real barrier lies in the underlying friction. Politics and history are not taught objectively in Chinese schools. In public schools, Morality and Rule of Law is a compulsory course in which students memorize freedom of speech as one of the fundamental rights of Chinese citizens, while significant historical events may go untaught. In international schools, A- Level Politics and AP Comparative Government and Politics are often not offered, China-related content in English textbooks are whited out, and student-led clubs discussing comparative politics have been threatened with closure. As a result, the main way to learn about Chinese politics is independent research with a VPN. This is certainly doable but requires awareness, initiative, and skill. Parents sometimes mention aspects of politics informally, but their accounts can be partial. This friction makes it harder for the average Chinese debater to engage with US debaters on Chinese politics on equal ground.

III. “We vs. Them” narrative

Two factors may drive some US debaters to exaggerate the Chinese threat in their impact analysis. One is the prevalent “China’s rise” narrative, which portrays China as an aggressive challenger to the US-led global order. The other is the large impacts that arguments about Chinese expansion, such as military threats and nuclear buildup, may carry. When these arguments are made, Chinese debaters can feel being cast as enemies, since the country they are tied to and deeply associated with is portrayed as a malicious actor and existential threat to the community of liberal democracies. A further source of discomfort is that these representations of the China threat are widely circulated in the debate community. The more something is said, the more convincing it becomes. Many US debaters are convinced that the Chinese threat is indeed real and that China is more aggressive than it is. Ultimately, this can heighten tension between the American and Chinese peoples, especially the younger generation. Since they will become the future decision-makers, it risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that really worsens US-China relations. For these reasons, many Chinese debaters may feel uncomfortable when American debaters make arguments that are sensitive in the Chinese political context. Yet many of them continue debating despite being uncomfortable with the conversation. This is often for one of three reasons. They may fear that their discomfort will not be understood or taken seriously.

They may be unfamiliar with theory debate. Or they may worry that voicing concerns outright will appear disrespectful to their opponents. An asymmetry in the understanding of Chinese debaters’ lived experiences can lead to poorly informed theory debates.

Difficulties exist for American debaters, too. When Chinese debaters initiate theory debates, some find it hard to craft responses because they lack contextual knowledge about the situation. Some simply drop arguments to avoid a theory debate in which they will be informationally disadvantaged or unintentionally come across as disrespectful or biased. But this means giving up materials they worked hard to prepare.

Fortunately, there are two cost-effective solutions that can ease these tensions and make debate more equitable and inclusive for both Chinese and American debaters.

First, we can disseminate more contextual information about Chinese debaters’ lived political experiences within the debate community. This means encouraging open knowledge exchange among US debaters and a willingness to share among Chinese debaters. As Chinese debaters’ reactions to arguments about Chinese politics become better understood, they can be more open about their constraints or discomfort, making the debate a more inclusive and educational experience. US debaters, meanwhile, will find it easier to respond to Chinese debaters’ arguments as well as understanding the other side’s discomfort. They will also have more flexibility in choosing arguments that are both strategic and respectful.

Second, we can encourage more Chinese debaters who are uncomfortable discussing Chinese politics to disclose their preferences before rounds. This ensures equity while respecting the effort that American debaters put in the round. They can choose the most strategic case and arguments before the round, rather than being forced to choose between dropping arguments and a heated theory debate. Early disclosure also means that Chinese debaters are less likely to be caught off guard by arguments on Chinese politics. If a theory debate does arise, it will be a more respectful and meaningful one.

At the end of the day, the debate community should be equitable and inclusive for everyone who values this educational opportunity. Chinese debaters’ structural constraints and discomfort deserve attention. The chance to have meaningful conversations and learn from their American peers is often the very reason Chinese debaters partake in US-hosted tournaments.

At the same time, Chinese debaters’ political knowledge shouldn’t create unfairness for US debaters; instead, we should reciprocate the respect and consideration shown to us. Finally, this article is by no means a call to avoid arguments on Chinese politics. Rather, it calls on the debate community to act so that debates between Chinese and American debaters are better informed and more educational for all. This article is not only about the US and China. It is also an invitation to other debaters facing similar tensions to share under-appreciated political and cultural contexts, along with solutions to the inequities they face. With greater understanding and consideration for each other, we can build a more inclusive educational space for all.